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The purpose of this thesis is to determine how the De-
partment of Defense value engineering policies and process-
ing procedures affect a contractor's motivation to submit
value engineering change proposals. A comparative analysis
of the DOD Value Engineering Program with private industry's
value analysis program and also an examination of how the
Hughes Aircraft Company has used the DOD Value Engineering
Program, resulted in three conclusions. The first conclusion
is that the incentives offered by the DOD Value Engineering
Program have been found by private industry to be ineffective
in attracting supplier participation in value analysis. The
second conclusion is that delays in incorporating the VECP
in the end-item significantly reduces a contractor's motiva-
tion to submit future VECPs. The third conclusion is that
the contractor's perception of the government buying activ-
ity's willingness to fairly evaluate VECPs is the most sig-
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an understand-
ing of how the Department of Defense value engineering change
proposal (VECP) policies and processing procedures affect a
contractor's motivation to submit VECPs. This chapter will
provide a definition of value engineering (VE) as well as a
brief history of the origins of value engineering, a state-
ment of the research problem, a statement of the research
objectives, the research questions to be addressed, the re-
search scope, and a statement of the research methodology.
B. DEFINITION OF VALUE ENGINEERING
The basic premis is that the functions of a product,
whether it be a weapon system for the Government or a con-
sumer good which results in its performance meeting the re-
quirements of the customer, can be identified [Ref. l:p. 11].
Understanding the desired function of a product is the basis
for determining the value of a product. Value engineering
is therefore an engineering tool by which the functions of a
product are defined and which utilizes the latest technical
information available to develop lower cost engineering and
manufacturing solutions and alternatives to satisfy the de-
sired function [Ref. l:p. 13]. Value engineering attempts
to answer the following questions:
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1. What is the item?
2. What does it cost?
3. What does it do?
4. What else would do the job?
5. What would that alternative cost?
Value engineering within the Department of Defense is
defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation as:
The formal technique by which contractors may (1)
voluntarily suggest methods for performing more economical-
ly and share in any resulting savings or (2) be required
to establish a program to identify and submit to the Govern-
ment methods for performing more economically. Value en-
gineering attempts to eliminate, without impairing essen-
tial functions or characteristics, anything that increases
acquisition, operation, or support costs. [Ref. 2:p. 48-2]
This definition gives value engineering the appearance
of being similar to a beneficial suggestion program but with
an emphasis on cost reduction. It is really meant to be more
than that. DOD Handbook 5010. 8H provides a definition of
value engineering to be:
. . . a systematic effort directed at analyzing the func-
tional requirements of DOD systems, equipment, facilities,
procedures, and supplies for the purpose of achieving the
essential functions at the lowest total cost, consistent
with the needed performance, reliability, quality, and
maintainability. [Ref. 3:p. 1]
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE ORIGINS OF VALUE ENGINEERING
During WW II, shortages of critical materials forced man-
ufacturers to utilize substitute materials and to alter de-
signs to conserve scarce materials. The General Electric
Company closely monitored the performance of the substitute
materials that were used in their products and found that
they provided equal or better performance at less cost. It
was this observation that caused General Electric to more
closely examine how product efficiency could be improved by
developing substitute materials [Ref. 4:p. 1].
In 1947, General Electric assigned Mr. Lawrence D. Miles,
a staff engineer, to design a methodology through which the
value of a product could be developed. Through a collabora-
tion with Mr. Henry Erlicker, who was Vice-President in
charge of purchasing, a successful methodology was developed
which they called "Value Analysis." Initial tests of this
methodology were highly successful and their first value ana-
lysis project resulted in a $200,000 per year savings to
General Electric. [Ref. 5:p. 3]
The results of General Electric 's value analysis pro-
jects were widely publicized and the concept spread very
quickly as private industry began to understand the potential
for large returns on relatively modest investments [Ref. 4:
p. 1]. In 1954, Rear Admiral Leggett of the U.S. Navy Bureau
of Ships set up, with the assistance of General Electric, a
value analysis program for Navy ship construction. The Navy's
program for ship construction was very successful and led to
the Army adopting a similar program in 1955 [Ref. 5:pp. 1-3].
Since the concept of value analysis was first developed,
it has been called by a host of names including value engi-
neering, value management, and value improvement. All of
these are essentially synonymous with one another. However,
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today, a distinction has developed between the terms value
analysis and value engineering. The term "value analysis"
is typically associated with the commercial sector of private
industry and is principally accomplished by purchasing per-
sonnel. The term "value engineering" is typically associated
with the Department of Defense and its major contractors and
is principally accomplished by design engineers.
In the early 1960s, Secretary of Defense McNamara ' s Cost
Reduction Program brought about the adoption of value engi-
neering for all of the DOD and the establishment of the
Directorate of Productivity and Value Engineering within the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Logistics). In 1964, the first value engineering clause
was incorporated into the Armed Services Procurement Regula-
tion (now the Federal Acquisition Regulation). This clause
provided an incentive to the contractor to develop cost sav-
ing ideas by allowing the contractor to share in the net sav-
ings resulted from the incorporation of value engineering
changes. [Ref. 5:p. 3]
The increased emphasis on value engineering that was
generated by the Cost Reduction Program resulted in a number
of seminars and conferences. It is worthwhile to note that
one of the most common points made during these seminars and
conferences was that the Government really did want to have
a value engineering program. It would seem that a large num-
ber of people from both private industry and the Department
of Defense were indifferent toward value engineering and
possible saw it as just one more cost reduction program that
would soon go out of favor. At a 1969 Value Engineering Con-
ference at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Lieutenant General
H. E. Goldsworthy stated,
I have been asked to address the rhetorical question:
"Does the Air Force really want value engineering?" The
answer is obviously a resounding and unqualified, "Yes."
Otherwise, I am sure we wouldn't be here. Why do we
bother, then, to ask the question? Since its inception,
the VE program has been beset with misunderstanding and
inhibiting inuendo. It has been necessary for us to
constantly reassure our contractors of our sincere in-
tentions. This conference is only one of many such ef-
forts. Though we believe much progress has been made
in gaining a better understanding, much remains to be
done. [Ref. 6: p. 33]
As interest in McNamara ' s Cost Reduction Program waned,
so did interest in value engineering. However, with the in-
troduction of DOD Directive 5000.1 in July 1971 with its
design-to-cost concept, interest in value engineering was re-
vived. VE was seen as a methodology by which design-to-cost
objectives could be met. In February 1972, DOD Directive
5010.8, "Department of Defense Value Engineering," was issued
and has remained the principle DOD policy guidance on value
engineering outside of what is contained in the Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation.
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The Department of Defense Value Engineering Program has
been in existence since 1964. From its very beginning, value
engineering has been surrounded by controversy and has ex-
perienced a number of peaks and valleys in terms of its
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popularity within the Department of Defense. Today, with
DOD budgets undergoing a high degree of scrutiny, the value
engineering program has received renewed importance within
the DOD as a cost cutting tool. With this renewed importance,
DOD is concerned with how to motivate contractors to partici-
pate in the DOD Value Engineering Program in a meaningful way.
E. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an understand-
ing of how the Department of Defense value engineering change
proposal policies and processing procedures affect a contrac-
tor's motivation to submit VECPs
.
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is derived from the research
objective and asks, "How do the Government's value engineer-
ing policies and processing procedures affect the contractor's
motivation to submit value engineering change proposals?"
Secondary research questions are: (1) What are the signifi-
cant features of the DOD Value Engineering Program?; (2) How
does the DOD Value Engineering Program compare with private
industry's value analysis program for commercial products?;
(3) How do DOD contractors view the DOD Value Engineering
Program?; (4) How do DOD program managers and contracting
officers view the DOD Value Engineering Program?; (5) How
might the Department of Defense restructure its value engi-
neering program so as to improve its effectiveness?
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G. SCOPE
This thesis will develop an understanding of how DOD VECP
policies and processing procedures affect a contractor's mo-
tivation to submit VECPs. To answer this research question,
this thesis will bring together the results of surveys and
research work that have already been completed and will also
examine how a DOD contractor has used the DOD Value Engineer-
ing Program.
The Hughes Aircraft Company has been selected as the DOD
contractor to be examined. There are three reasons for
selecting Hughes: (1) Hughes has been an active participant
in the DOD Value Engineering Program since it was first in-
troduced; (2) Hughes builds technologically similar weapon
systems for all three of the military services and has sub-
mitted VECPs on all of the weapon systems (TOW missile for
the Army, the PHOENIX for the Navy, and the MAVERICK missile
for the Air Force); and, (3) Hughes is one of the most ex-
perience defense suppliers.
The observations made concerning the problems and percep-
tions of the current value engineering program will therefore
be made within the context of the interface between the Hughes
Aircraft Company's missile Systems Group, its program offices
and the purchasing agencies of the respective military ser-
vices. This research effort will not address the DOD ' s in-
house value engineering program.
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H. METHODOLOGY
This research effort will be completed through the use
of literature research and interviews with key value engi-
neering personnel at the Navy's Naval Air Systems Command
and the Army's Missile Command. Within the Hughes Aircraft
Company, key value engineering managers at the corporate
level and engineering personnel at the program level were
interviewed.
The literature research includes a review of: (1) Pro-
fessional journals and periodicals; (2) Research reports
published by United States military postgraduate schools;
and, (3) United States Department of Defense Publications.
13
II. POD VE PROGRAM FOR CONTRACTORS
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter will describe the DOD Value Engineering Pro-
gram for contractors as it is presently structured within
Part 48 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The
contractor program is structured around a Value Engineering
clause which, with certain exceptions, is mandatory for all
contracts over $100,000. The VE clause can be modified to
accomodate two separate VE programs for contractors; an in-
centive program in which participation is voluntary and a
mandatory program in which the Government requires and sep-
arately pays for a specific level of effort. The contractor
develops and submits a value engineering change proposal to
communicate their cost saving idea to the Government. The
VE clause provides for a sharing of net savings with the con-
tractor. The chapter will conclude with a statistical sum-
mary of how well 'the DOD VE program for contractors has
performed.
B. VALUE ENGINEERING PROGRAM STRUCTURE
The DOD Value Engineering Program for contractors has
two contractual approaches to it. The first is a voluntary
approach in which the contractor uses his own in-house fund-
ing and personnel to develop and submit cost saving ideas.
The second approach is a mandated program in which the
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Government requires and pays for a specific value engineer-
ing program effort. In this case, the value engineering ef-
fort would be included as a separately priced item of work
in the contract Schedule. [Ref. 2:p. 48-2]
Under both the voluntary program and the mandatory pro-
gram, the contractor communicates cost saving ideas to the
Government by means of a value engineering change proposal.
A VECP is defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation as:
. . . a proposal that (a) Requires a change to the instant
contract to implement; and (b) Results in reducing the
overall projected cost to the agency without impairing
essential functions or characteristics. [Ref. 2:p. 48-2]
Under this definition, a cost saving idea that can be
implemented without a modification to the instant contract
lies outside the scope of a VECP. However, this does not
mean that the contractor would be prevented from implementing
the cost saving idea on his own.
Cost savings under the Value Engineering Program can be
categorized as being instant, concurrent, future, or collat-
eral. Instant contract savings are the net cost reductions
on the current contract under which the VECP is submitted
and accepted. Concurrent contract savings are net reductions
in the prices of other contracts for the same item that are
definitized and ongoing at the time the VECP is accepted.
For example, a contractor could be producing an item under
several contracts. Although the VECP can be submitted under
only one of the current contracts, the cost saving idea is
applied to all contracts currently under production. Future
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contract savings are the product of the estimated future unit
cost reduction multiplied by the number of future contract
units scheduled for delivery during the sharing period. Col-
lateral savings are derived from a buying agency's measurable
net reduction in overall costs of operating the end item
which are attributable to the VECP. For example, an accepted
VECP may have a measurable impact on fuel consumption or per-
haps maintenance costs. [Ref. 2:p. 48-2]
The emphasis for all types of savings is on the net re-
duction in costs to the Government. It is quite possible
for a VECP to reduce the costs of a component yet increase
the costs of the system in which it is installed. For exam-
ple, the Government may purchase an electronics assembly
from contractor A and then give the assembly to contractor B
as government furnished equipment (GFE) under a weapon sys-
tem contract. If contractor A submits a VECP for the elec-
tronics assembly, it may very well reduce the costs of the
electronics assembly but, when installed in the weapon system
which is manufactured by contractor B, the costs of the over-
all weapon system may increase due to design changes that
contractor B would have to make to accomodate the VECP.
Contractual implementation of value engineering is accom-
plished through the use of a Value Engineering clause. The
clause can be altered to accomodate situations where a manda-
tory value engineering program is to be used or where both a
mandatory and voluntary program are to be used. The unaltered
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Value Engineering clause alone would be used when only a
voluntary program is desired.
With a few exceptions, a Value Engineering clause is re-
quired by the Federal Acquisition Regulation to be in all
solicitations and contracts that are $100,000 or more in
value. If the contracting officer sees a potential for a
significant savings, a Value Engineering clause may be in-
cluded in contracts with a value of less than $100,000. A
Value Engineering clause will not be included in contracts
for research and development other than full scale develop-
ment nor will it be included in contracts which provide pro-
duct or component improvement unless the Value Engineering
clause is restricted to areas not covered for product or
component improvement. [Ref. 2: p. 48-4]
In choosing the type of VE clause to include in a con-
tract, a contracting officer will evaluate whether or not
the benefits from value engineering can only be realized
through a regular and systematic effort. If they can, the
mandatory value engineering program will be selected and a
separately priced line item for value engineering effort will
be included in the contract [Ref. 7:p. 5]. However, where
the contract is for the production of an item that has a sta-
ble design and manufacturing process, the voluntary program
is considered to be more appropriate [Ref. 7:p. 5].
FAR requirements for value engineering can create certain
problems for the government contracting officer. In an en-
vironment where at least part of a systems development
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contract is geared toward rewarding contractor achievement
of cost goals through general efficiency and tradeoffs of
nonessential performance requirements or specifications, the
negotiator must not create a situation where VE incentives
duplicate the overall contract incentive structure; but,
must also affirmatively include a VE clause.
As has been the case with the DOD Value Engineering Pro-
gram since it was first made a part of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation, the head of the procurring activity
can still determine that value engineering is inappropriate
for a single contract or a class of contracts in which it
would otherwise be required.
Prior to 1974, the sharing rates for instant and future
contract savings as well as the future sharing periods were
not fixed. They were subject to negotiation between the
Government and the contractor. Since 1974, the sharing rates
and the sharing periods have become fixed. At the time the
rates and sharing periods became fixed, there was the percep-
tion that the contractors were demanding the highest sharing
ratio possible and then using it as a bargaining point for
other concessions in the contract. The one exception to the
fixed sharing rate is with incentive contracts. In this case,
the share ratio may be the same as the overall contract in-
centive ratio. [Ref. 7:p. 18]
Table 1 shows the current Government/Contractor sharing
ratios given in the Federal Acquisition Regulation's Value
Engineering (Apr 1984) clause.
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TABLE 1
GOVERNMENT/CCONTRACTOR SHARES OF VECP SAVINGS
(All Figures in Percent)
Voluntary Mandatory
Future and Future and
Contract Type Instant Concurrent Instant Concurrent
Fixed-price 50/50 50/50 75/25 75/25
(other than incentive)
Incentive * 50/50 * 75/25
(fixed-price or cost)
Cost-reimbursement 75/25 725/25 85/15 85/15
(other than incentive)
*same as the sharing ratio in the contract
Source: Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 48.
C. DOD VALUE ENGINEERING PROGRAM STATISTICS
The data presented in Figures 1 through 4 were compiled
by the DOD Product Engineering Services Office at the Defense
Logistics Agency. All dollar values are expressed in con-
stant 1984 dollars. Figure 1 shows the estimated VECP sav-
ings to the DOD since fiscal year 1967. As can be seen, the
Value Engineering program has had a number of peaks and val-
leys in terms of the overall benefits derived by the Govern-
ment. From its beginnings in fiscal year 1965, value
engineering showed a phenomenal growth up until fiscal year
1971. It was in fiscal year 1971 that the principle of
design-to-cost was first introduced. Even though value en-
gineering was a way of facilitating the achievement of design-
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Engineering program. Figure 2 points out the shift in the
emphasis given VE by showing how the number of personnel
dedicated to value engineering has dramatically declined
from a high of 204 in fiscal year 1972 to a level of 146 in
fiscal year 1976.
Figure 3 shows how each of the three military services
has benefitted from the Value Engineering program. Prior to
fiscal year 1984, the Army consistently outperformed the Navy
and the Air Force in terms of the dollar savings achieved and
also in terms of the percentage of total obligational author-
ity (TOA) which is shown in Figure 4.
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III. POD VE PROGRAM: A COMPARISON WITH VALUE ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an understand-
ing of how private industry views the DOD Value Engineering
Program by comparing and contrasting it to private industry's
value analysis (VA) program for its commercial products.
Since VE has its origins in VA, an understanding of the dif-
ferences between VA in the commercial world and VE within
the DOD can provide an important insight into private indus-
try's overall perceptions of DOD's VE program. Purchasing
magazine completed two very extensive surveys of purchasing
managers within private industry to find out the status of
value analysis. The results from these surveys will be used
to portray private industry's value analysis program.
This chapter identifies two significant differences be-
tween value analysis and DOD value engineering. The first
difference is that DOD value engineering is exclusively con-
cerned with cost reduction where value analysis is more
broadly applied to include other factors such as quality,
safety, and marketing appeal. The second significant differ-
ence is that DOD value engineering effort is rewarded through
a shared savings arrangement while value analysis programs
reward suppliers with more business.
25
B. VALUE ANALYSIS SURVEY RESULTS
In an article published by Purchasing magazine, a pur-
chasing manager was quoted as saying,
A lot of our traditional stresses on negotiations
and price don't measure up any more. Companies like
ours are being asked to take 20-30% out of the cost
of the end product. You can't do that by throwing
quotes around. You've got to dig deeper. Purchasing
must get into the design and function of purchased
parts. [Ref. 8:p. 100]
In the commercial world, value engineering's sister pro-
gram of value analysis is alive and well. In March of 1984,
Purchasing magazine published the results of a very compre-
hensive survey which revealed that value analysis within the
commercial sector is flourishing in all types of manufactur-
ing companies. The survey, which contacted almost 2000 pur-
chasing executives from the Fortune 10000 companies, was
designed to provide a status report on value analysis and
attempted to answer the following questions:
1. How old are VA programs?
2. Why have VA programs been started?
3. What has been the payback from VA?
4. What role do suppliers have in VA?
5. How does private industry motivate their supplier's
participation in VA?
6. What are the ingredients to a successful VE program?
The following is a summary of what the Purchasing maga-
zine survey revealed about private industry's value analysis
programs.
26
1 . Age of VA Programs
Even though the concept of value analysis has been
around for more than 40 years, the average age of commer-
cial value analysis programs at the time of the survey was
8.9 years and the median age was 7.5 years. Indeed, half
of the purchasing managers surveyed said that their value
analysis programs were five years old or less. This shows
that private industry has been very slow to initiate a for-
mal value analysis program. Table 2 summarizes how the sur-
vey respondents answered the question: "How long have VE
programs been in effect?"
TABLE 2
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2 . Reasons for Starting VA
In determining what are the significant factors
which cause companies to start a value analysis program, 96%
of the respondents to the survey saw value analysis as a way
to reduce costs. Even more importantly, 65% of the respon-
dents saw value analysis as a way to improve quality. Table
3 summarizes how the survey respondents answered the ques-




REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING A VA PROGRAM
REASON % RESPONDENTS
1. Reduces costs. 96%
2. Improves quality. 65%
3. Encourages teamwork. 37%
4. Encourages supplier involvement. 31%
5. Better satisfy user ' s needs. 25%
6. Meet new marketing objectives. 25%
The results of the survey point out very clearly
that value analysis has other benefits besides cost reduc-
tion. It is also a very effective way to stabilize costs
while improving quality. Private industry is now facing a
significant amount of foreign competition at a time when
the U.S. dollar has been particularly strong. The Purchas-
ing survey found that the pressures to keep costs down have
been stronger. The survey found that 57% of purchasing
managers who responded to the survey are planning to in-




The real worth of a value analysis program to pri-
vate industry is the dollar return on the dollar investment
in value analysis. Respondents to the survey indicated a
payback of from 3:1 to 67:1. On an average basis, the pay-
back seems to be between 25:1 and 30:1 [Ref. 9:p. 85],
Some companies have been able to completely offset inflation




Respondents to the survey revealed that a great deal
of emphasis is placed on supplier participation in the value
analysis process. There were four main reasons given. They
are:
1. Almost every supplier is a specialist of one kind or
another.
2. Technology is racing ahead so fast that no one com-
pany can keep up.
3. Make vs. buy studies favor outside procurement as
companies seek to rationalize their product lines
and trim overhead.
4. Factory automation puts equipment suppliers on the
same value-added level as materials and parts
producers.
Private industry feels that they do not always have
the technical expertise that is necessary to conduct a VA
program and so they are increasingly looking to their sup-
pliers for assistance [Ref. 9:p. 89].
5 Supplier Motivation
To encourage a supplier's value analysis contribu-
tions, respondents to the Purchasing survey identified five
methods to reward suppliers for their VA help. They are
summarized below in Table 4.
Respondents to the survey indicated that incentive
contracts that share savings are not very popular with sup-
pliers. The main reason for this is that it can be a "clean-
er" transaction to pay a supplier separately for their design
assistance because anticipated volume on an item may not
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TABLE 4
METHODS OF SUPPLIER REWARD
SUPPLIER REWARD % RESPONDENTS
1. Supplier is offered more business. 86%
2. Supplier gets first order without 41%
competition.
3. Supplier is paid separately for his 10%
technical help.
4. Supplier gets severval orders with- 9%
out competition.
5. Formal incentive contracts that
share savings.
develop. This would leave the supplier with unrecovered
expenses [Ref. 9:p. 93]. What suppliers want, more than
anything else, from their value analysis effort is more
business. Consequently, purchasing managers have come to
use supplier value analysis participation as a key element
of supplier evaluation [Ref. 9:p. 83].
6
.
Key Ingredients to a Successful VA Program
Respondents to the Purchasing survey indicated that
a successful value analysis program has four key ingredients
These key ingredients are:
1. A proper system for rewarding good ideas.
2. Showing suppliers that you are sincere and serious
about wanting their value analysis help.
3. Techniques for sparking a supplier's interest in a
specific area must have a bit of flair.
4. Ideas must not be allowed to die a lingering death
while suppliers are wondering what is happening.
7 Problems with Value Analysis
Even though value analysis has been demonstrated
to be such an effective means for cost control and improved
30
quality, value analysis must still be "sold" to various
groups within a corporate organization. The March 28, 1985
issue of Purchasing was devoted entirely to the subject of
selling value analysis and began with the statement,
As those who have carried the VA [value analysis] torch
over the years know, VA is something that must be con-
tinually sold and resold within the company and to sup-
pliers. Without a well-planned sales campaign, in
fact, a VA program will abort on take-off, or run out
of gas long before all targets have been hit. [Ref.
8:p. 99]
A follow-up survey of purchasing managers in 1985
by Purchasing magazine revealed that a strong tendency
exists for departments within a company to resist value ana-
lysis because it requires an interdepartmental team venture,
Functions normally assigned to one group (e.g., design en-
gineering) are now open for inspection by another group
(e.g., purchasing) and vice versa [Ref. 8:p. 109]. If this
attitude is coupled with a lack of top management support,
an effective VA program will never exist [Ref. 8:p. 100].
Another area for resistence is that design engineers feel
that their original specifications are already the best.
Once a specification has been established, it is very diffi-
cult for the design engineer to change to something that is
unknown or unfamiliar [Ref. 8:p. 108]. Additionally, oper-
ations personnel often times feel that they are in fact
performing value analysis through their day-to-day work rou-
tines. A formal value analysis program is seen as being
duplicative [Ref. 8:p. 113].
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C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
From the Purchasing magazine survey results, private in-
dustry's value analysis program can be characterized as
being a relatively young program that was initiated as a
result of increased foreign competition. It can also be
described as involving the active participation of suppliers
who are motivated to participate through the prospect of
receiving more business. This characterization of value
analysis presents two very significant differences between
it and the DOD Value Engineering Program.
The most significant difference concerns the types of
benefits achieved. The DOD VE program has its sole empha-
sis on cost reduction. The Federal Acquisition Regulation
specifically states that in order for a VECP to be approved,
there must be an overall net reduction in the costs to the
Government. With private industry operating in a competi-
tive market for its commercial goods, "value" is defined in
a much broader sense to include such things as quality,
safety, etc. ' The General Electric Company, the original
developer of value analysis techniques, has made some sig-
nificant changes in the emphasis of their VA program. From
a strictly cost reduction emphasis, they now emphasize qual-
ity and the achievement of designs which lend themselves to
automated production. [Ref. 9:p. 101]
The DOD VE program's emphasis on cost reduction has been
a criticism made by private industry for quite some time.
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At a value engineering symposium conducted at the U.S. Air
Force Academy in 1969, the Vice President for Product Ef-
fectiveness at Hughes Aircraft Company made the following
comment about the DOD VE Program,
The classical VE approach has been to concentrate on
costs - to provide a lower cost alternative that does not
degrade performance. In the expression of value as being
equal to performance divided by cost, reducing cost cer-
tainly increases value. But improving performance with
costs held constant also increases value. Value analysis
techniques have equal validity when applied to the per-
formance side of the ratio. Improvements in reliability
(frequently a byproduct of classical VA studies) reduce
costs of maintenance and support, as well as improving
mission effectiveness. [Ref. 6:p. 77]
The second significant difference concerns the method
by which suppliers are rewarded for their cost saving ideas.
The DOD Value Engineering Program relies exclusively on the
sharing of overall net savings. As was shown in Table 4,
private industry has found that this is the least desirable
method of rewarding suppliers for their value engineering
effort. However, there is no evidence to suggest that this
is a factor which works against contractor participation in
the DOD VE program. In fact, in a 1977 survey that was com-
pleted by the Florida Institute of Technology, 24 defense
contractors were asked a series of questions about the Value
Engineering program. In response to the question: "Do you
believe the current sharing formulas provide an adequate in-
centive?", 15 contractors said, "Yes." When asked if it was
absolutely necessary to increase the percentage of savings
given to industry to attract contractor participation, 17
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contractors said, "No" [Ref. 10:p. 25]. It would seem,
then, that private industry is willing to accept shared
savings as a reward for their value engineering effort.
However, as Table 4 points out, when given a choice their
preference is to have more business.
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IV. POD VE PROGRAM: AN INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT
A. OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an understand-
ing of how private industry views the DOD Value Engineering
Program by examining how a DOD contractor has used the DOD
VE program and to learn their perceptions and concerns about
DOD value engineering. The Hughes Aircraft Company was se-
lected as the DOD contractor to be examined because Hughes
has been active in the DOD VE program since its very begin-
ning. Hughes has submitted VECPs on 52 programs involving
all three of the military services and received the DOD
Value Engineering Award for fiscal year 1984. Hughes, there-
fore, can give some very valuable insights into how DOD VE
policies and processing procedures influence a contractor's
motivation to participate in the DOD Value Engineering
Program.
B. VALUE ENGINEERING AT HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY
The Hughes Aircraft Company has had a great amount of
success in working with the DOD Value Engineering Program.
Since the DOD VE program's first introduction in the early
1960s, Hughes has had 705 VECPs approved on 52 programs
among all three of the military services. The total negoti-
ated savings has been $887 million with the Government's
share of the savings being $719 million (computed over the
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total life of the program) and Hughes' share being $168
million. Hughes' share of the savings may seem dispropor-
tionally small in comparison to the Government's share.
However, Hughes' share is calculated only for the savings
realized under the instant contract and future savings dur-
ing the sharing period. After considering a total contrac-
tor reimbursed overhead expenditure of $64.4 million for
VECP development, the Government has realized a return on
reimbursed overhead of 11 to 1. This is to say that the
Government has saved $11 for every $1 invested in VECPs de-
veloped and submitted by the Hughes Aircraft Company.
With such a successful record of performance in dealing
with the DOD Value Engineering Program, Hughes is in a posi-
tion to give very valuable insights into how private indus-
try might view the overall DOD Value Engineering Program.
To get Hughes' insights, in-depth interviews were conducted
with value engineering managers at both the corporate level
and the program level. At the program level, interviews
were conducted with VE personnel who were assigned to pro-
grams within the Hughes' Missile Systems Group (MSG). The
MSG is rather unique in that it builds a technologically
similar weapon system for each of the three military ser-
vices. Table 5 shows the three missile systems manufactured
by Hughes and the VECP activity for each missile.
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TABLE 5
VECP ACTIVITY WITHIN THE MISSILE SYSTEMS GROUP
MAVERICK TOW PHOENIX
(AIR FORCE) (ARMY) (NAVY)
VECPs SUBMITTED 182 189 2
VECPs APPROVED 107 (58.7%) 169 (89.4%) 2
GOVT SAVINGS $178 mil. $138 mil. $14 mil
HUGHES SAVINGS $ 60 mil. $ 37 mil. $ 1 mil
C. DEVELOPMENT OF VE IDEAS AT HUGHES
A contractor's first involvement with the DOD VE pro-
gram begins with a cost saving idea. To generate cost sav-
ing ideas, Hughes has an extensive training program which
is tailored to meet the needs of five different groups of
VE users. VE workshops have been designed for corporate
headquarters personnel, contracting personnel, cost reduc-
tion teams, and subcontractors. In the past 25 years,
Hughes has trained over 8,000 personnel in the use of value
engineering. With this level of exposure, Hughes has had
no shortage of ideas. However, the most significant source
of ideas comes from the structured workshops conducted for
the cost reduction teams. A cost reduction team consists
of personnel from a variety of disciplines who are assigned
to study a specific component of a weapon system and to
generate ideas for reducing the costs of producing the
component.
Within the Hughes organization, a value engineering idea
is submitted as a one page value engineering change request
( VECR ) that presents the idea in very basic terms and
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contains very little detail. The VECR is presented to a
value engineering review board which consists of the senior
engineer on the program as well as the value engineering
manager for the program. The review board looks at the VECR
in terms of its technical feasibility and its potential fi-
nancial risks and rewards. If a VECR seems as though it may
be technically feasible and the financial risks are within
tolerable bounds, a value engineering change authorization
(VECA) is prepared. The VECA provides a more extensive def-
inition of the technical feasibility of the idea and also
provides a more in-depth estimate of the gross costs for
development and implementation as well as the estimated sav-
ings on the instant contract plus future contract savings.
These cost and savings estimates are generated in the same
manner as Hughes would price out an engineering change pro-
posal (ECP). The only difference, of course, would be that
in the case of a VECP Hughes would identify cost savings.
When the VECA is completed, overhead funds are allocated to
the VECA so that the idea can be demonstrated. After the
VECA has been submitted and the cost saving idea has been
adequately demonstrated, an engineer is specifically assigned
to the VECA to help present the idea to the Hughes Config-
uration Control Board (CCB). The engineer will make a pre-
sentation to the CCB so that a determination can be made as
to whether or not the idea is worth investing additional
overhead funds and if a full testing program is required.
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If further testing is required, a final review of the com-
pleted value engineering change proposal package is made by
the CCB. Once the VECP is approved by the Hughes CCB, the
program's value engineering manager becomes responsible to
the program manager at Hughes for processing the VECP sub-
missions through the appropriate military purchasing activ-
ity. Hughes' program value engineering managers can be
dedicated full-time to value engineering or may be assigned
on a part-time basis. Currently, Hughes has four personnel
assigned full-time and 54 personnel assigned part-time.
D. PERCEPTIONS AND CONCERNS
A decision by Hughes to submit a VECP comes after a very
careful consideration of its technical and financial merits.
With a $3 million annual budget for the development of VECPs,
Hughes is looking for an appropriate return on their invest-
ment. The investment of their resources includes personnel
resources as well as financial. In evaluating whether or
not to pursue the development of a VECP, Hughes will first
consider the relative priority of the VECP in comparison to
other priorities which may surround a particular program.
If a program is suffering from technical problems or is be-
hind in meeting contract delivery schedules, then taking
personnel away from a program and assigning them to value
engineering may not be well received by a program manager.
However, barring any conflicting priorities such as techni-
cal or schedule problems, Hughes must also evaluate the
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potential for the VECP to be accepted by the Government.
This is where Hughes' perceptions and concerns about the
DOD VE program are of critical importance.
Hughes has learned that it is not sufficient to just
submit a VECP to a government purchasing activity and to
then let the Government's VECP processing procedures take
over. In the experience of Hughes, a substantial amount of
effort has to be completed unofficially before the submis-
sion of a VECP can occur. Otherwise, Hughes feels that a
VECP has only a 30% change of being approved. By briefing
the proper contracting and technical personnel at the Govern-
ment purchasing activity in advance, Hughes has experienced
a 59% approval rate for the MAVERICK missile and an 89% ap-
proval rate for the TOW missile.
1 . Impact of Government Attitude
During this researcher's interviews with Hughes'
value engineering personnel, two factors were identified as
being critical to Hughes' decision as to whether or not a
VECP should be submitted. The most significant factor was
Hughes ' perception of how receptive the program management
and contracting personnel at the government purchasing ac-
tivity are toward the submission of VECPs. Hughes has heard
a number of senior officials within the DOD express a desire
to see more participation by contractors in the DOD Value
Engineering Program. However, Hughes does not see a compa-
rable level of enthusiasm at the working level (i.e., the
40
government contracting officer and the program manager).
Hughes has come to realize that the acceptance or rejection
of a VECP is more dependent upon the working level within
the Government than it is upon the senior management levels.
In the experience of Hughes, some DOD program managers have
flatly told Hughes that VECPs will not be approved irrespec-
tive of the merits of the VECP submitted. Of course, this
is an extreme and rare situation. However, there are vari-
ous degrees of receptiveness toward VECPs which are shown
by government personnel and Hughes will evaluate the level
that exists at a particular government purchasing activity.
For example, if Hughes estimates that at a certain government
purchasing activity there is only a 50% chance for a VECP to
be approved, would they be willing to invest, for example,
$100,000 to develop a VECP?
2 . Timeliness of Government VECP Processing
A second factor which was critical to Hughes' deci-
sion as to whether or not a VECP should be submitted was the
timeliness with which VECPs are processed by the government
pruchasing activity. Hughes feels that many times the pur-
chasing activities of the DOD take too long in reviewing
VECPs. The Federal Acquisition Regulation states that the
contracting officer shall have 45 days in which to accept
or reject the VECP. However, if the Government will need
more time to evaluate the VECP, then the contracting officer
must notify the contractor in writing giving the reasons for
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the delay and the anticipated decision date [Ref. 5:p. 48-3],
In the experience of Hughes, only one of the military ser-
vices is willing to give approval or disapproval within 45
days. The other services go through a very long process
that, in some cases, can take over two years to complete.
The one military service that gives approval within 45 days,
gives technical approval only and then immediately imple-
ments the VECP via a change order that puts a ceiling on
the amount of savings that can be negotiated. When the sav-
ings to the Government has been negotiated, the definitized
VECP is implemented with a contract modification. Techni-
cal implementation via a change order is advantageous to
Hughes in that the VECP is implemented much more quickly and
the delivery quantities over which the savings to the Gov-
ernment are shared are also greater. The Government also
benefits because it realizes a reduction in the contract
price on a greater quantity of the end item being delivered.
The other military services will not issue a change
order to implement the VECP upon technical approval. In-
stead, the VECP submission package is reviewed for complete-
ness, then it is granted technical approval if appropriate,
and then the savings to the Government are negotiated. Once
negotiations are completed, a contract modification is
issued and the VECP is then implemented. In this case,
Hughes is at a disadvantage because the sharing quantities
under the instant contract are much less because so much
42
time has been spent reviewing and approving the VECP. The
Government is also at a disadvantage, not only because the
price reduction is not applicable to as large a quantity,
but also because a VECP may require a backfit to a poten-
tially large number of end items that have already been
delivered.
Hughes is more highly motivated to submit a VECP at
the beginning of a production contract that is near the end
of a production contract. The reason is that production
quantities remaining on the instant contract are much high-
er at the beginning of the contract. Consequently, the
shared savings potential is much greater. However, if the
time it takes the Government to approve and implement the
VECP is too long, the advantage gained by submitting a VECP
at the beginning of a production contract is lost. Hughes
will evaluate how long a government purchasing activity will
take to review and implement a VECP and may find that with
certain purchasing activities the potential financial return
on a VECP is too low to warrant an investment of their
resources.
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V. POD VE PROGRAM: A POD WORKING
LEVEL VIEWPOINT
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter presents a generalized VECP processing se-
quence which shows how a typical POP buying activity will
process a VECP. This chapter concludes with a discussion
of three significant concerns that program managers and con-
tracting officers, the "working level," have about the POP
Value Engineering Program. These concerns deal with the
validity of VECP cost savings estimates; the increasing re-
quirement for up-front funding of VECP research and develop-
ment costs; and, the imposition of unrealistic VE goals.
B. VECP PROCESSING
From the stand-point of a program manager or a contract-
ing officer, a value engineering change proposal is nothing
more than an engineering change proposal in which the con-
tractor alleges that the Government will derive a cost sav-
ing if the VECP is implemented. With the exception of this
one distinction, there is really no other difference between
a VECP and an ECP. Both must be submitted by the contractor
in accordance with the requirements set forth in POP-STP-
480A; both must receive technical approval from the buying
activity's change control board (CCB); both require the
availability of funds for implementation; both are subject
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to cost analysis and the eventual negotiation of a price in-
crease (or decrease in the case of a VECP ) ; and, both are
implemented through the modification of an existing contract,
It is therefore not surprising that a VECP is processed in
essentially the same manner as an ECP. Figure 5 shows what
a typical VECP processing sequence involves. This sequence
was derived from value engineering instructions and config-
uration management manuals published by the various DOD
buying activities visited by this researcher. While Figure
5 may not exactly describe the processing of VECPs at all
military activities, it does show the general pattern of
processing that is usually followed.
As was pointed out in Chapter 4, a considerable amount
of informal discussions and briefings must take place be-
tween the contractor and the Government prior to the submis-
sion of a VECP. DOD configuration control manuals generally
restrict the ability of a contractor to submit unsolicited
ECPs and, in fact, some specifically state that unsolicited
ECPs shall be disapproved unless they are to correct defi-
ciencies, make significant changes in effectiveness, or re-
sult in substantial life cycle cost savings. The normal
processing of an ECP requires the contractor to first obtain
an informal and unofficial agreement concerning the techni-
cal feasibility of the ECP from the military buying activity
Then, instead of the contractor submitting an ECP, the mili-














Unofficial and tenative agreement on the technical
feasibility of the VECP
.
^^ Formal submission of the VECP package.
^4} Distribution of the VECP to the program office and
the command VE office.
(5) Technical and funds availability review.
£5} Technical approval or disapproval.
(jj Purchase request to modify the instant contract to
incorporate the VECP and possibly a change order to
implement the VECP as soon as possible.
Qp Negotiation of estimated savings.
f9) Issuance of a contract modification for an approved
VECP or the issuance of a letter disapproving the VECP
Figure 5
Typical DOD VECP Processing Sequence
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contractor who then submits a cost proposal for an equitable
adjustment to the contract. In this way, the number of "un-
solicited" ECPs is kept to a small number.
A VECP is subjected to the same informal and unofficial
scrutiny as an ECP. However, after obtaining an unofficial
agreement on the technical feasibility of the VECP from the
Government, the contractor must directly submit the VECP to
the contracting officer who will then distribute the VECP
package to the appropriate program office for technical re-
view and a funding availability determination. There is no
such thing as the Government directing a VECP to a contrac-
tor. However, interviews with value engineering managers at
Hughes revealed that military buying activities have been
known to reject a VECP and then direct a no-cost ECP to the
contractor. This, in effect, is a directed VECP with the
contractor's share of the savings limited to the current
production contract. For example, under normal circumstances,
an ECP would involve the Government obligating additional
funds to cover the cost of its implementation. A "no-cost"
ECP means that the contractor will implement the ECP with no
financial obligation to the Government. In the case of a
disapproved VECP that has been converted to a no-cost ECP,
the Government is telling the contractor to implement the
VECP at the contractor's expense and to keep 100% of any
savings generated under the instant contract. There would
be no reduction in the unit price on the instant contract
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and there would be no sharing of future or collateral
savings.
The technical review of the VECP will be accomplished
in the exact same manner as an ECP. The technical evalua-
tion process will be structured so that all aspects of the
VECP are evaluated and the results of the evaluation con-
solidated for presentation to the buying activity's change
control board for formal technical approval. The evaluation
of the VECP will include the following:
1. The relative merit of the proposed change versus the
unchanged items.
2. The technical competence of personnel and the facili-
ties required to accomplish the change.
3. The manhour backlog to incorporate changes that have
already been approved.
4. The effect on spares, repair parts, data, and
publications
.
5. The effect on delivery schedules.
6. The effect on training and training equipment.
7. The effect on test and support equipment.
8. The availability of funds.
9. The effect on reliability and maintainability.
To consider all of the above factors, as many as 14
separate reviews would have to be made by as many different
offices within a buying activity.
While the review and approval process conducted by the
program office and the change control board will emphasize
the technical aspects of the VECP, the determination of
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funds availability will also require an evaluation of the
contractor's estimated cost savings . If technical approval
is granted, the VECP is returned to the contracting officer
for negotiation of the cost savings and an eventual modifi-
cation of the contract to incorporate the VECP. Some ser-
vices will issue a change order along with technical
approval of the VECP. This allows the VECP to be implemented
in the end item as soon as possible. However, the change or-
der would "ceiling price" the savings at the level proposed
by the contractor. The cost savings would then be negotiated
by the contracting officer who would then issue a contract
modification to definitize the contract. If a change order
is not issued, the VECP cannot be implemented until the cost
savings to the Government are negotiated and a contract mod-
ification is issued.
A contracting officer will not question the technical
decision made by the change control board or the cost saving
evaluation made by the program office as part of the funds
availability determination. In general, if there is a sig-
nificant amount of skepticism concerning the contractor '
s
estimate of the cost savings, a contracting officer will
typically be hesitant to go through the lengthly process of
negotiating the contractor's VECP cost proposal. Instead,
the contracting officer would be more inclined to issue a
final disapproval of the VECP on the grounds that the Gov-
ernment will not realize a cost savings. The contracting
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officer's decision to approve or disapprove the VECP is not
subject to the Disputes clause or otherwise subject to liti-
gation under the Contracts Disputes Act of 1978 [Ref. 2:p.
48-3]. If the VECP is disapproved, the contractor has little
choice but to either withdraw the VECP prior to disapproval
and resubmit the VECP as a costed ECP, or accept a directed,
no-cost ECP from the Government.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation states that all VECPs
shall be accepted or rejected by the Government within 45
days from its receipt by the Government. However, if more
time is required to evaluate the VECP, the contractor must
be notified in writing and is to be given an anticipated
decision date [Ref. 2:p. 48-3]. Since VECPs are processed
in essentially the same manner as ECPs, the time standards
that apply to ECP processing would also apply to VECP pro-
cessing. ECPs are assigned priorities in accordance with
the urgency of the proposed change. For example, engineer-
ing changes that are for improved safety are accorded a
higher priority than non-safety related changes.
Some buying activities are capable of making a technical
evaluation within 45 days if the contractor is responsible
for maintaining configuration control of the end item. How-
ever, if the buying activity maintains configuration control,
the technical evaluation of a routine ECP will take at least
120 days. When coupled with the audit and negotiation of
the contractor's cost proposal, the implementation of a VECP
can take ten months or longer.
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The value engineering office at a buying activity does
not play a central role in the processing of a VECP. Some
commands are structured so that the contractor submits
VECPs directly to the VE office rather than to the contrac-
ting officer. This is sometimes done so that VECP process-
ing times can be more closely monitored. In general, the
VE office at a buying activity has no authority to grant
technical approval or to contractually obligate the Govern-
ment. However, in most cases, the VE office does have the
right of disapproval if strong objections are made against
the contractor's VECP submission. The VE office is princi-
pally responsible for promoting the DOD Value Engineering
Program within the buying activity and with the activity's
contractors. The VE office also provides training to con-
tracting and program management personnel within the activ-
ty. The overall success or failure of the activity's value
engineering program is the responsibility of the VE office.
However, program managers are increasingly being held re-
sponsible for the achievement of VE goals assigned to their
respective programs.
C. PERCEPTIONS AND CONCERNS
During this researcher's interviews with DOD program
managers and contracting officers, there was an unanimous
agreement on the validity of value engineering as a cost
cutting concept. However, there was little agreement as to
the efficacy of the DOD Value Engineering Program. Program
51
managers and contracting officers have a pervasive suspicion
of a contractor's claim that the Government will save money
by implementing a VECP. However, no personnel interviewed
by this researcher could point to specific data to substan-
tiate their suspicions. Their suspicions were instead based
on past dealings with a variety of conractors and also their
personal knowledge of a program and the technology involved
with it. The personnel interviewed were more than willing
to accept VECPs so long as the negotiated savings to the
Government could be verified through an audit of actual cost
data.
There is a certain amount of validity to the suspicions
of government personnel. In a report completed for the U.S.
Air Force in 1975 by the RAND Corporation, the results of
an audit of VECPs implemented in the F-lll was summarized.
From late 1964 through early 1972, 55 VECPs were implemented
in the F-lll aircraft. Actual cost data was available for
35 of the VECPs. Of these, 35, ten of the VECPs actually
resulted in increased costs to the Government. Of the re-
maining 25 VECPs that produced an audited savings, 13 re-
sulted in a savings which was less than originally estimated
and eight VECPs resulted in a savings which was larger than
originally estimated. In the case of four VECPs, the final
savings equalled the estimated savings [Ref. 7:p. 10]. The
RAND study went on to say that the reliability of the cost
savings estimates made by the contractor is very questionable
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because their savings estimates are based on inference
rather than hard information [Ref. 7:p. 11].
Another significant concern among program managers and
contracting officers is the fact that contractors are sub-
mitting VECPs which require a significant amount of up-front
funding for research and development effort. A contractor
will submit a VECP that may require up to three years of re-
search and development before it can be implemented in the
end item. Generally speaking, this type of VECP involves
the development of a special application of a known tech-
nology to the end item being value engineered. Because of
the long development and implementation period, no instant
contract savings will be realized by the contractor. How-
ever, once the VECP is incorporated in the end-item, the
contractor's share of future savings begins for a period of
three years. Therefore, if the VECP requires a three year
development period and the contractor also has a share of a
three year future savings period, the contractor maintains
an interest in the production of an end-item for a period
of six years from the date the VECP is approved.
Contractors want the Government to approve VECPs of this
type because it allow them to incorporate new technology
into their products and therefore be more competitive for
future contract awards. However, program managers and con-
tracting officers are reluctant to provide such substantial
sums of up-front money for VECPs whose savings have not yet
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been demonstrated. Secondly, three years is a long time for
a program to maintain a stable configuration. During this
research and development time period, a number of other
changes could be made which would negate or severely reduce
the impact of a VECP approved three years earlier. Govern-
ment personnel interviewed were basically split in their
opinion on how a superceded VECP should be handled. Some
felt that if a VECP was submitted in good faith, the contrac-
tor should receive their share of the savings that was nego-
tiated and made a part of the contract, even though the
Government could no longer derive a benefit from the VECP.
Others felt that if a contractor submits an ECP which super-
cedes a prior VECP, the contractor should receive only that
portion of the superceded VECP savings which is in excess of
the cost associated with implementing the ECP. The rationale
for this view is that a VECP must provide a savings to the
Government. If the VECP is superceded during the sharing
period, then the savings has been diminished and the contrac-
tor's share should also be diminished.
A final significant concern among contracting officers
and program managers relates to the setting of value engineer-
ing goals. In general, value engineering goals for each of
the services is measured in terms of a percentage of total
obligational authority (TOA). This percentage is, of course,
translated into procurement dollar goals which are assigned
to each acquisition program at a buying activity. Program
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managers and contracting officers strive to meet their as-
signed goals. However, goals that are assigned to programs
without the agreement of the program manager, are seen as
being unrealistic and encouraging the acceptance of VECPs
which would not normally be considered under the DOD Value
Engineering Program. Personnel interviewed stated that un-
realistic value engineering goals must be developed within
the context of the resources available and current program
priorities. Value engineering goals should be established
only after considering the availability of personnel re-
sources to evaluate the VECPs, the design stability of the
weapon system, and the reliability of current cost estimates
against which VECP savings are computed.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations
which are a result of the research effort. Three conclusions
are made. The first conclusion deals with the inadequacy of
the incentives offered as a reward for participation in the
DOD Value Engineering Program. The second conclusion con-
cerns the effect of processing delays on contractor motiva-
tion and the third conclusion deals with the effect of DOD
"working level" attitudes toward the VE program. Based on
these three conclusions, recommendations are made which offer
a means to not only encourage greater contractor participa-
tion in value engineering but also to reduce the suspicions
that DOD program managers and contracting officers have about
VECPs.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The primary research question of this thesis is to deter-
mine how the Government's value engineering policies and pro-
cessing procedures affect a contractor's motivation to
participate in the DOD Value Engineering Program. From the
results of the research, three conclusions can be made. The
first conclusion is that the incentives offered to contrac-
tors to participate in the DOD Value Engineering Program have
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been found by private industry to be ineffective in attract-
ing supplier participation in value analysis programs for
commercial products. Suppliers will allocate their scarce
resources so that the incremental return on their investment
is sufficient to justify their incremental costs. The re-
turn that the supplier will realize from a long-term stable
business base that is his reward for participation in value
analysis may be greater than the return for the short-term
monetary reward offered by the DOD Value Engineering Program.
Consequently, contractors who have actively participated in
value analysis programs may be hesitant to allocate their
limited resources to conduct value engineering on items pro-
duced for the Government. However, for manufacturers who
derive a majority of their revenue from the Government, this
may not be as great a factor.
The second conclusion derived from the research effort
is that any delay in incorporating the VECP in the end-item
significantly reduces a contractor's motivation to submit
future VECPs. The main reason that a delay would have such
a negative impact is that a contractor's share of instant
contract savings is reduced. So long as the VECP can be in-
corporated in the end-item when technical approval is obtained,
other types of processing delays will not have a significant
impact on a contractor's motivation to submit future VECPs.
The third conclusion is that the most significant influ-
ence on a contractor's motivation to submit VECPs is the
57
contractor's perception of the government buying agency's
willingness to fairly evaluate the VECP. The contractor has
spent a considerable amount of time, effort and money in de-
veloping the VECP and they want it to be seriously considered.
If the buying activity comes up with unjustifiable reasons
for rejecting a VECP or if the VECP results in a directed,
no-cost ECP, a contractor's motivation to submit future VECPs
will be significantly reduced.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
If the DOD Value Engineering Program is going to be suc-
cessful in the future, greater contractor participation must
occur. However, this is only half of the requirement. In
addition to greater contractor participation, there must also
be a greater willingness on the part of DOD buying activities
to accept VECPs. DOD program managers and contracting offi-
cers are usually willing to accept and fund a performance en-
hancing engineering change. However, they are hesitant to
accept and fund a value engineering change that will save the
Government money on future procurements. It isn't that pro-
gram managers and contracting officers do not want to save
the Government money. It is a basic belief that a VECP will
not result in a savings to the Government and that the con-
tractor has ulterior motives for submitting the VECP. As a
result of this suspicion, DOD program managers and contrac-
ting officers engage in a number of tactics to disapprove
VECPs and to discourage their submission in the future. The
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following recommendations are therefore made with the pur-
pose of providing procedural guarantees to contractors that
VECPs will be evaluated fairly. Additionally, the recommen-
dations also address the needs of program managers and con-
tracting officers to have better assurances that VECPs are
in fact resulting in a cost savings.
The first recommendation is to do away with the require-
ment that VECPs be approved within 45 days. This requirement
is almost impossible for the Government to meet and does noth-
ing but create additional administrative workload for contrac-
ting officers. In order for the buying activity to do a
thorough job of technically evaluating a VECP, a sufficient
amount of time must be allocated. The allocation of time
will depend upon the relative priority of the VECP in rela-
tion to other engineering changes that must also be evaluated.
Given the fact that a routine ECP can be technically evalu-
ated in 120 days, it would seem reasonable that a routine
VECP could also be evaluated in 120 days. The 45 day approv-
al deadline should be changed to 120 days. However, once
technical approval is granted, the VECP should be immediately
implemented by means of a change order. In this way, delays
that may occur in negotiating the savings will not take away
from the contractor's instant contract savings. The change
order should "ceiling price" the savings at the level pro-
posed by the contractor.
When technical approval has been granted and a ceiling
priced change order has been issued, the VECP savings to the
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Government can be negotiated. If an audit and analysis of
the contractor's proposed savings estimate reveals that the
Government will not accrue a savings, then the VECP can be
rejected and converted to a directed ECP if the Government
so desires. However, in fairness to the contractor, the
disapproval of a VECP should be made subject to the Disputes
clause of the contract. This will force contracting officers
to provide a good and valid reason for disapproving the VECP.
If a VECP is approved and the negotiated savings to the
Government is greater than $100,000, the VECP should be sub-
ject to an audit of the actual savings realized by the Gov-
ernment. If the actual savings is found to be less than the
negotiated savings, the contractor's share of the savings
should be recomputed and any difference refunded to the Gov-
ernment. However, if the actual savings to the Government
is greater than the negotiated savings, then the contractor's
share should be recomputed and any difference should be given
to the contractor. In this way, program managers and con-
tracting officers at the buying agencies will know whether or
not a savings was actually achieved and, as a consequence,
their willingness to accept a VECP will be increased. The
contractor will feel protected from having his VECP converted
into a no-cost ECP and, having recourse under the Disputes
clause, will know that the VECP will be evaluated fairly.
Additionally, contractors will have an incentive to meet or
exceed the cost savings achieved by the VECP because the VECP
savings will be validated through an audit.
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In light of the increasing emphasis on the competitive
award of government contracts, the non-competitive award of
future contracts as an incentive for contractor participation
in the DOD Value Engineering Program is not considered by
this researcher to be realistic. However, a similar result
can be approximated by including in a request for proposal
( RFP ) the requirement that the contractor's value engineer-
ing program be described as part of the contractor's cost
proposal. By making value engineering a part of the cost
proposal, a greater awareness of value engineering will be
created among government contracting officers. Contractors
who have maintained an effective value engineering program
will gain a competitive edge over contractors who have not.
All other factors being equal, the contractor with the best
value engineering program will be awarded the contract. This
can be an especially effective technique to promote value en-
gineering in today's environment where cost is given equal
weight with technical requirements. The Government will not
be awarding contracts non-competitively but will still recog-
nize a contractor's overall desire to be rewarded for
participating in the DOD Value Engineering Program by receiv-
ing more business.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As the DOD includes in more of its acquisition strategies
the development of a second production source, new procedures
are going to be needed to control the concurrent development
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of a VECP, the allocation of VECP savings, and the implementa-
tion of the VECP in the production lines of both contractors.
Research is necessary to explore various methods by which
VECPs can be processed under dual source production.
Very little research has been conducted on the DOD in-
house value engineering program. Some of the military ser-
vices have a very extensive value engineering program at
their depots and laboratories. There is little understanding
of how the DOD in-house value engineering program complements
or supplements the DOD Value Engineering Program for contrac-
tors. Research which compares and contrasts the two programs
and their achieved savings may provide some useful insight
into how the DOD should structure its value engineering ef-
fort in the future.
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